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3. AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP LAW 
AGENCY LAW 
Pearlie KOH 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore),  
LLM (University of Melbourne); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);  
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Actual authority 
3.1 Actual authority creates a legal relationship between the 
principal and his agent pursuant to which the agent is empowered to act 
on the principal’s behalf. Such empowerment may be by express words 
(and hence express authority) or implied from the conduct of the parties 
and the circumstances of the case (and therefore implied authority): see 
Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (“Hely-Hutchinson”) 
at 583. Implied authority is, as much as express authority, a species of 
actual authority. Nevertheless, it often coincides with apparent authority, 
which, being merely what appears to others as authority, is in fact no 
authority at all. 
3.2 This coincidence is often illustrated by contrasting the 
well-known English cases of Hely-Hutchinson and Freeman & Lockyer v 
Buckhurst Part Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (“Freeman & 
Lockyer”). In Hely-Hutchinson, the English Court of Appeal found that 
the chairman of the defendant company had the implied actual 
authority to give an indemnity on behalf of the company. This finding 
was reached on the basis that the board of the defendant company had, 
by its consent and acquiescence, permitted him to act as the managing 
director. In contrast, a differently constituted Court of Appeal declined 
to imply actual authority on broadly similar facts in the earlier decision 
of Freeman & Lockyer, preferring instead to found liability on the basis 
of apparent authority. Diplock LJ stated (Freeman & Lockyer at 501): 
I accept that such actual authority could have been conferred by the 
board without a formal resolution recorded in the minutes … but to 
confer actual authority would have required not merely the silent 
acquiescence of the individual members of the board, but the 
communication by words or conduct of their respective consents to one 
another and to [the director in question]. [emphasis added] 
3.3 It may well be that it is of little consequence in many cases 
which particular concept applied. After all, despite the fact that, 
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conceptually, implied authority is the very antithesis of apparent 
authority (see Ian Brown, “Authority and Necessity in the Law of 
Agency” (1992) 55 MLR 414 at 416), the result of a successful plea of 
one or the other, is ultimately very much the same. However, there may 
be cases where a plaintiff ’s case is better, or perhaps more confidently, 
advanced on the basis of actual, rather than apparent, authority. In 
Hely-Hutchinson, for example, the fact that the plaintiff was himself a 
member of the board of the defendant company meant that there were 
concerns whether the requisite representation and reliance could be 
established. As counsel for the defendant company had argued 
(Hely-Hutchinson at 574): 
… in order to establish [the director’s] ostensible authority [the 
plaintiff] would in effect have to rely on a representation assumed to 
have been made by the board of [the defendant company] (of which 
he himself was a member) to himself … 
It is not clear what impact this would have had on an argument 
premised on apparent authority. 
3.4 The High Court decision of Singapore Salvage Engineers Pte 
Ltd v North Sea Drilling Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 5 was a case in 
which both concepts were potentially applicable. The case, however, had 
proceeded solely on the basis of implied actual authority. 
3.5 The plaintiff had provided certain specialist marine services to 
the defendant which had been procured by one Choo, and for which the 
defendant had not made payment. The defendant, whose business was 
to provide support services for operations carried out on an oil rig, did 
not deny that Choo was employed as its “procurement logistics 
manager” but asserted that Choo did not have the express authority to 
transact on the defendant’s behalf for values that went beyond $5,000. 
The plaintiff was claiming for a sum that far exceeded this limit. The 
question therefore was whether Choo nevertheless had the implied 
actual authority to contract with the plaintiff on the defendant’s behalf. 
3.6 The evidence showed that, whilst there might have been an 
internal protocol requiring Choo to obtain approval prior to exceeding 
the $5,000 transaction limit, he rarely, if ever, complied with this. There 
was little oversight or supervision over Choo’s activities, and 
transactions entered into by Choo on the defendant’s behalf, whether 
with the plaintiff or other vendors, were never repudiated, even where 
these exceeded $5,000. The court found that Choo’s superiors must have 
known about Choo’s activities but nevertheless permitted him to 
proceed. The court noted that, quite unlike other cases involving agents 
who exceeded their authority for personal gain, Choo had acted entirely 
honestly and to the best of his ability. In the circumstances, the court 
held that it was a necessary inference on these facts that the defendant 
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had given Choo the actual, albeit implied, authority to transact on its 
behalf beyond the $5,000 limit. 
3.7 It was, however, an undisputed fact that although Choo held the 
position of “procurement logistics manager”, he had scant knowledge or 
experience to source for suitable vendors in the industry. As the court 
noted (at [23]), notwithstanding Choo’s formal position, “he would have 
been unable to make any substantive decisions on such matters, and that 
was presumably the reason for the alleged limitations on his authority”. 
Under such circumstances, it seemed at least arguable that something 
more than acquiescence would have been required to establish actual 
authority. The defendant’s adoption of the otherwise unauthorised 
transactions could be analysed as acts of ratification, which do not, as a 
general rule, effect the agency relationship represented by actual 
authority: see Tan Cheng Han, The Law of Agency (Academy Publishing, 
2010) at para 06.007. Neither does ratification confer future authority: 
see Chitty on Contracts vol 2 (Hugh G Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 
32nd Ed, 2015) (“Chitty on Contracts”) at para 31-027; see also Peter 
Watts & Francis M B Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 20th Ed, 2014) (“Bowstead and Reynolds”) 
at para 2-048. On the other hand, repeated acts of ratification could 
amount to a sufficient representation of authority upon which a finding 
of apparent authority could be premised. 
Apparent authority 
3.8 Apparent authority arises where a person (referred to here for 
convenience as the “principal” although he is not technically one), by his 
words or conduct, leads another (the contractor) to believe that he has 
authorised a particular person to act as his agent. Where the contractor 
transacts with the apparent agent on the faith of this belief, the principal 
may be bound by the acts of his apparent agent as though the latter had 
indeed been authorised. Returning to the facts of Singapore Salvage 
Engineers Pte Ltd v North Sea Drilling Singapore Pte Ltd, it may be 
readily appreciated how the conduct of the defendant, in repeatedly 
affirming the unauthorised acts of Choo, could very well amount to a 
representation to the plaintiff that Choo possessed the requisite 
authority to transact for the defendant. The same end result, that the 
defendant was bound by the transaction, could therefore be arrived at 
on this very different conceptual basis. 
3.9 It bears repeating, however, that apparent authority, quite unlike 
a situation of actual authority, does not create an agency relationship 
between the principal and the apparent agent. Instead, the legal 
relationship is one between the principal and the contractor, and is 
created by the principal’s representation to the contractor, manifested in 
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the form of words or conduct, which the contractor relied upon to alter 
his legal position. The doctrine is often said to be a form of estoppel, 
albeit a “weak” one: see Chitty on Contracts at para 31-056. As 
Diplock LJ stated in Freeman & Lockyer (above, para 3.2), “[t]o the 
relationship so created the agent is a stranger”: Freeman & Lockyer 
at 503. It follows therefore that the operative representation must 
originate from the principal, and any representation by the apparent and 
unauthorised agent cannot, as a general rule, operate to impose liability 
on the principal. 
3.10 The doctrine of apparent authority was applied in Viknesh Dairy 
Farm Pte Ltd v Balakrishnan s/o P S Maniam [2015] SGHC 27 (“Viknesh 
Dairy Farm Pte Ltd”). The plaintiff company operated a dairy farm on 
property that was leased from the Singapore Land Authority. It was 
required to obtain a certificate of statutory completion for certain 
buildings on the farm in order to renew the lease. To this end, it engaged 
one B to do the necessary paperwork and, for that purpose, granted him 
access to the farm premises. B then entered into agreements with the 
defendants, purportedly on the plaintiff ’s behalf, permitting them to 
dump earth on the farmland for a fee. B, who was less than honest, had 
made representations to the defendants that he was the plaintiff ’s 
professional engineer and that earth was needed in order to level the 
farmland. B pocketed the payments made by the defendants who had 
handed cash cheques to B in the belief that the latter was the plaintiff ’s 
agent. In the present action, the plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction 
to compel the defendants to remove earth that they had dumped on the 
farm. 
3.11 The issue before the court was whether the agreements were 
binding on the plaintiff so that the defendants’ earth-dumping acts were 
legitimate. The answer to this depended on whether B was possessed of 
the requisite authority, actual or apparent. The court found that B had 
only been authorised to assist the plaintiff in obtaining the certificate of 
statutory completion. He therefore had no actual authority to permit the 
dumping of earth on the land. The question then was whether B had 
been clothed with the appearance of authority by the plaintiff so that the 
latter could not then deny B’s apparent authority. 
3.12 In Freeman & Lockyer, Diplock LJ had explained the doctrine of 
apparent authority as follows (Freeman & Lockyer at 503): 
An ‘apparent’ or ‘ostensible’ authority … is … created by a 
representation, made by the principal to the contractor, intended to be 
and in fact acted upon by the contractor, that the agent has authority 
to enter on behalf of the principal into a contract of a kind within the 
scope of the ‘apparent’ authority, so as to render the principal liable to 
perform any obligations imposed upon him by such contract. 
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3.13 The court in the present case found that B had the apparent 
authority to bind the plaintiff to the earth-dumping agreements on the 
basis of the following facts: 
(a) B was authorised to enter the farm premises. 
(b) There were visible signs of earth dumping prior to the 
defendants’ earth-dumping operations. 
(c) The plaintiff (through its managing director) did not 
protest despite being aware of the defendants’ impugned acts. 
The court stated (Viknesh Dairy Farm Pte Ltd at [61]): 
Those facts would have led [the defendants] to believe that [B] was 
indeed the plaintiff ’s agent for the purpose of obtaining the [certificate 
of statutory completion]. [The defendants] had taken [B’s] 
representation that he was a [professional engineer] as the truth. They 
were entitled to rely on it. In fact the circumstances in which the earth 
dumping was done caused [the defendants] to believe that [B] must be 
the agent of the plaintiff otherwise the latter would have stopped the 
earth dumping almost immediately. [emphasis added] 
3.14 As already noted, the doctrine of apparent authority is premised 
upon a representation, not by the agent, but by the principal. The 
evidence should therefore show that it was the plaintiff, through its 
managing director, who had led the defendants to believe that B was its 
agent. In this connection, any representation by the purported agent 
himself cannot suffice. Indeed, the Court of Appeal had, in 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Pub), Singapore Branch v Asia 
Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 540 at [38], reiterated 
the “established principle” that “the law does not recognise the notion of 
what is commonly termed a ‘self-authorising’ agent”. To the extent that 
the italicised phrase in the quote above might suggest that the court was 
prepared to accept B’s representation as the operative representation with 
which to impose liability on the plaintiff, this would, with respect, be 
contrary to received principles. 
3.15 The court’s conclusion that the plaintiff had clothed B with 
apparent authority on the basis of the facts as stated also seemed overly 
generous. First, it is difficult to appreciate how the fact that B was 
authorised to enter the farm premises amounted to a representation 
that B was authorised to contract on the plaintiff ’s behalf. Secondly, it is 
not clear how the fact that earth had previously been dumped on the 
land amounted to a representation to the defendants that B was 
authorised to agree with the defendants for the dumping of earth. As 
pointed out above, it is undoubted that a previous course of dealings can 
form the premise for a finding of apparent authority. However, in order 
to amount to an operative representation for this purpose, the past 
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dealings must relate to the principal’s acceptance or acquiescence of the 
unauthorised agent’s previous dealing with the contractor in question, 
which, as Lord Keith of Kinkel suggested in Armagas Ltd v 
Mundogas SA [1986] 1 AC 717 at 777, may arise out of the principal 
honouring transactions arising out of those dealings. Only in such 
circumstances would the previous course of dealing amount to a 
representation by the principal as regards the agent’s authority. In the 
present case, the past earth-dumping activities were the result not of B’s 
acts but of the plaintiff ’s managing director, who would, in all 
likelihood, have been authorised in any case. The relevance of this fact 
to the issue at hand is therefore doubtful. 
3.16 Thirdly, the court attached much weight to the fact that the 
plaintiff did not protest about the defendants’ activities, despite being 
well aware of the same. Conceptually, in order for a contractor to have 
relied on any representation of the principal, the representation must 
have been made prior to the act of reliance. The defendants’ awareness of 
the plaintiff ’s lack of protest arose after they had agreed with B, the 
purported agent. They therefore could not have relied as such on this 
fact in agreeing with B. Nevertheless, there have been cases where, 
notwithstanding the lack of actual or apparent authority, the principal 
may still be affected by “true estoppel” (see Chitty on Contracts 
at para 31-057) if he knew that a contractor was labouring under the 
belief that the impugned transaction fell within the scope of the 
purported agent’s authority but did nothing to disabuse the contractor 
of his misplaced belief to the contractor’s detriment. This involves the 
application of the principles of general law estoppel and is sometimes 
referred to as “agency by estoppel” or “estoppel from denying existence 
of agency relationship”: see Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 
at para 2-099. Establishing an agency in this sense does not depend on 
showing that the principal had made a representation of the kind 
necessary for apparent authority to arise. The court in Viknesh Dairy 
Farm Pte Ltd, however, appeared to have proceeded solely on the basis 
of apparent authority. 
Agency by estoppel 
3.17 The occasion for considering and applying the concept of 
agency by estoppel did subsequently arise in The Bunga Melati 5 [2015] 
SGHC 190. Referring to Bowstead and Reynolds at para 2-099, the 
High Court there stated at [31]) that an agency by estoppel could arise 
even in the absence of a representation by the principal: 
[W]here the principal, having notice of [a belief that the agent was 
authorised] and that this belief might induce others to change their 
position, did not take (often after the operative transaction) 
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reasonable steps to notify those others of the facts. [emphasis in 
original] 
3.18 Thus formulated, the concept is clearly relevant to the factual 
scenario in Viknesh Dairy Farm Pte Ltd. The court in The Bunga 
Melati 5, however, made it clear that any estoppel could only arise if 
there was an obligation to notify the contractor in question. The learned 
judge observed as follows (The Bunga Melati 5 at [37]): 
I do not think that in an agency situation a duty to speak can arise in 
the absence of a pre-existing relationship or dealings between the 
purported agent and the party claiming under the contract. To impose 
such a duty would impose onerous obligations on would-be principals 
who would then bear the responsibility of correcting all 
misrepresentations made by parties claiming to be their agents despite 
playing no role in the relevant transactions. 
3.19 In The Bunga Melati 5, the plaintiff had delivered bunkers (that 
is, fuel oil) to the defendant’s ships for which it had not been paid. The 
contracts for the purchase and delivery of the bunkers were negotiated 
through bunker brokers who would connect the buyers with the 
vendors. However, it was not the defendant who communicated with the 
brokers vis-à-vis the contracts. Instead, it was Market Asia Link Sdn Bhd 
(“MAL”), a supplier of bunkers, who communicated with the brokers. 
The question, therefore, was whether MAL, in transacting for the 
purchase of the bunkers from the plaintiff, had acted as the defendant’s 
agent. The defendant, which was one of the largest shipowners in the 
world, had a certain modus operandi when it came to making purchases 
of equipment and supplies. Specifically, it could only make purchases 
from pre-approved, or “registered”, vendors, and MAL was a registered 
vendor of bunkers. The relationship between MAL and the defendant, 
therefore, was not one of agency but of supplier and buyer. 
3.20 The plaintiff had attempted to argue that the defendant had 
nevertheless granted MAL actual authority to act on the former’s behalf 
on a couple of grounds. First, it was argued that this could be inferred 
from the evidence, which showed that the defendant tended to 
treat MAL preferentially over the defendant’s other vendors, and also 
that they shared an exceptionally close relationship that appeared to go 
beyond purely commercial interests. The court held that whilst this 
might well be the case, the only inference that could be drawn from the 
evidence related to a lack of good corporate governance on the 
defendant’s part rather than any intention to confer actual authority 
on MAL. 
3.21 Secondly, it was argued that, as the defendant knew that MAL 
would have to contract with bunker suppliers in order to fulfil the 
contracts awarded by the defendant, this meant that the defendant had 
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impliedly authorised MAL to acquire the bunkers on its behalf. The 
court rejected this argument on the ground that (at [79]): 
[I]t would not have been reasonable for [the defendant] and MAL to 
perceive that MAL had been appointed as [the defendant’s] agent on 
[the] sole basis [that the defendant had awarded the contracts to MAL 
with the requisite knowledge] – mere acquiescence by a principal to a 
purported agent’s misrepresentation to third parties cannot be 
tantamount to an agreement to validate further representations by 
altering the legal position between parties. 
3.22 The plaintiff had also attempted to argue that the defendant had 
clothed MAL with the apparent authority to act on its behalf. Whilst 
there was evidence that MAL had represented to the plaintiff that it was 
the defendant’s agent, this cannot form the basis for imposing any 
liability on the defendant as the representation came from the 
unauthorised agent. Given that the court found no evidence of any 
representation originating from the defendant, it concluded that there 
was simply no basis upon which to find any apparent authority. 
3.23 What then of the evidence that suggested that the defendant was 
aware that MAL had been representing itself as the defendant’s agent to 
suppliers generally? The court held (at [104]) that such knowledge could 
not, in and of itself, give rise to an estoppel as this would mean that 
there was imposed on the defendant a “general duty to broadcast to the 
world that [MAL] was not [the defendant’s] agent”. In order for an 
estoppel to arise, the defendant must be subject to a duty to speak. 
Quoting from Everbright Commercial Enterprises Pte Ltd v AXA 
Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 287 at [66], the court noted 
that such a duty would only arise where “silence would create an 
erroneous impression which leads the prospective representee to alter 
his position for the worse”: The Bunga Melati 5 at [35]. Specifically, the 
court considered that whilst the presence of a pre-existing relationship 
or course of dealings between the parties might conduce towards 
subjecting the defendant to a duty to speak, this in itself was 
nevertheless not a sufficient condition. 
3.24 On the facts of The Bunga Melati 5, the court held that the 
defendant did not owe the plaintiff any obligation to inform the latter 
that MAL was not the defendant’s agent. The evidence did not disclose 
any legal or other relationship or even any communications between the 
plaintiff and defendant upon which such an obligation might be 
founded. In any event, there was evidence that the plaintiff was itself in 
possession of information that would have indicated that the buyer 
was MAL, rather than the defendant. This would have put the plaintiff 
on inquiry vis-à-vis the purported agency relationship between the 
defendant and MAL. 
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3.25 The plaintiff in Viknesh Dairy Farm Pte Ltd (above, para 3.10) 
might, however, have had greater success with the doctrine. The 
evidence clearly showed that the plaintiff was aware of the earth-
dumping activity, which not only involved highly visible heavy 
machinery and large mounds of earth, but also took place over a period 
of a few months. As the court had noted, it would have been “reasonable 
for [the defendants] to believe that [the plaintiff] must have approved of 
the earth dumping at its Farm or the plaintiff would have stopped the 
activity if otherwise”: Viknesh Dairy Farm Pte Ltd at [58]. In such 
circumstances, it might well be that the plaintiff was (City Bank of 
Sydney v McLaughlin (1909) 9 CLR 615 at 625, cited in Bowstead and 
Reynolds at para 2-103): 
… bound by all rules of honesty not to be quiescent, but actively to 
dissent, when he knows that others have for his benefit put themselves 
in the position of disadvantage, from which, if he speaks or acts at 
once, they can extricate themselves, but from which, after a lapse of 
time, they can no longer escape. 
PARTNERSHIP LAW 
Stephen BULL 
BA, LLB (Hons) (Wellington), LLM (Harvard); 
Solicitor (England and Wales), Barrister and Solicitor (New Zealand), 
Member of the New York Bar; 
Associate Professor (Practice), School of Law,  
Singapore Management University. 
3.26 One partnership law case of significance was reported in 2015. 
In it the Court of Appeal considered the nature of the interests held by 
partners in partnership property consisting of land, and also the 
limitation period applicable to a claim by a deceased partner’s estate for 
his share of the partnership property. 
Relationship of partners between themselves 
Admission of new partner 
3.27 In Chiam Heng Hsien  v  Chiam Heng Chow [2015] 4 SLR 180 
(“Chiam Heng Hsien”), the Court of Appeal allowed in part the 
plaintiff ’s appeal against the decision of the High Court reported under 
the same name at [2014] SGHC 119: noted in (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 39 
at 41–44. 
3.28 The case concerned a family dispute over entitlement to share in 
the sale proceeds of a valuable plot of freehold land formerly occupied 
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by the Mitre Hotel near Orchard Road. A one-tenth undivided share in 
that property had been the main asset of a partnership named Mitre 
Hotel Proprietors (“MHP”) formed in 1951 by five members of the 
Chiam family, viz: Toh Say (holding a 25/88 share), Toh Moo (21/88), 
Toh Tong (21/88), Toh Kai (19/88) and Toh Lew (2/88). The 10% share 
was held by Toh Say “in trust for the firm and the partners for the time 
being thereof ”. The last of the original partners passed away in 1993 
and, following protracted litigation among the next generation of the 
family, the land was eventually sold in 2010. It fetched some $120m 
(having originally been purchased in 1948 for $61,000: see Chiam Heng 
Luan v Chiam Heng Hsien [2007] 4 SLR(R) 305 at [7]). The current 
proceedings were brought to determine who was entitled to share 
in MHP’s $12m portion of the proceeds. The plaintiff (and appellant), 
the son of Toh Moo, had become a partner in 1974. He sought a 
declaration that he was solely entitled to the money, asserting that he 
was the last remaining partner. This was opposed by the defendants 
(respondents on the appeal) who were the personal representatives of 
the estates of Toh Say, Toh Tong and Toh Kai (Toh Lew’s partnership 
share had been surrendered by his estate in 1984). 
3.29 The High Court concluded that all of the defendants had been 
admitted to the partnership, in their representative capacities, and so 
were entitled to share in the sale proceeds. Upon the plaintiff ’s appeal, 
the Court of Appeal, in a judgment delivered by Sundaresh Menon CJ, 
affirmed the High Court’s decision regarding the third and fourth 
defendants (representing Toh Tong’s and Toh Kai’s estates). However, it 
reversed the lower court with respect to the first and second defendants 
(representing Toh Say’s estate), holding that they had never been 
admitted as partners of MHP. It also rejected their alternative claim that 
they had succeeded to Toh Say’s entitlement to the partnership property, 
holding that the claim was time-barred. As a result, Toh Say’s share 
of MHP was held to have been extinguished. 
3.30 The dispute over whether the defendants, qua executors, had 
been admitted to the partnership mainly turned on issues of fact, viz, 
whether the plaintiff had impliedly consented to such admissions by his 
conduct. The Court of Appeal agreed that admission of an executor in 
the place of a deceased partner was not automatic by law, nor had any 
practice of MHP to that effect been established: Chiam Heng Hsien 
at [62]–[66]. The court further upheld the trial judge’s findings that the 
plaintiff ’s consent to the third and fourth defendants becoming partners 
had been sufficiently evidenced by his admissions in various sworn 
affidavits in earlier litigation. 
3.31 However, in the case of the first and second defendants, the 
appellate court disagreed with the trial judge regarding the significance 
of the business registration records of the Accounting and Corporate 
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Regulatory Authority (“ACRA”) which showed Toh Say’s estate as a 
partner of MHP. The court held that the plaintiff ’s failure to seek 
rectification of ACRA’s records could only be held against him if he 
owed a duty to the first and second defendants to do so. In the 
circumstances, such a duty was not justified as ACRA had indicated to 
him that its records were not conclusive as to partnerial status; further, 
the first and second defendants were well aware of his objections to their 
claims of partnership: Chiam Heng Hsien at [73]. As for the plaintiff ’s 
failure to object to the first and second defendants’ payment of a share of 
the property tax on the hotel, the court noted that Toh Say’s estate was 
legally liable to pay the tax as the registered owner of MHP’s one-tenth 
share, and held that the plaintiff ’s silence was not sufficiently 
unequivocal to amount to acquiescence: Chiam Heng Hsien at [76]–[77]. 
As a result, it held that Toh Say’s executors had not been admitted 
to MHP in his place following his death. 
Partnership property 
3.32 In the alternative, the first and second defendants in 
Chiam Heng Hsien had argued that Toh Say (along with the other 
original partners) had held a beneficial interest in MHP’s 10% share in 
the land, which interest devolved on them as Toh Say’s executors upon 
his death. Although the Court of Appeal upheld a procedural objection 
to the making of this argument, it had been fully argued and the court 
gave its substantive reasons for rejecting it. That entailed examining the 
legal nature of a partner’s interest in the partnership property, and also 
the limitation period applicable to a claim for a share in such property 
upon the exit of the partner from the firm (by death or otherwise). 
These questions were related because Toh Say died in 1990 and his 
partnership share had neither been paid out (as contemplated by the 
partnership deed) nor, as noted above, been taken over by his estate in 
the sense of being admitted as a partner. Under s 43 of the 
Partnership Act (Cap 391, 1994 Rev Ed) a claim for a deceased partner’s 
share in the partnership is stated, subject to contrary agreement, to be a 
“debt” accruing at the date of death. Accordingly, the six-year limitation 
period applicable to debts would prima facie bar a claim for such share 
by Toh Say’s estate. However, under s 22 of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 
1996 Rev Ed), an “action to recover trust property or the proceeds 
thereof ” is exempt from limitation, thus raising the issue of the extent to 
which a partner’s interest in the firm’s property is an interest under a 
trust. 
3.33 As is frequently true in partnership law, the question can be 
viewed from both external and internal aspects. An asset which 
constitutes partnership property is held by the legal owner (typically one 
or more of the partners) on trust for the firm, in the absence of contrary 
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agreement. Since a partnership lacks separate legal personality, “firm” 
here means the partners collectively; they are thus the beneficial owners 
of the asset as against the outside world. But whether an individual 
partner’s interest in that asset is properly described as a beneficial 
interest or simply as an equitable chose in action has been the subject of 
a nuanced difference of opinion – some Australian cases have taken the 
former view. In the present case, the Court of Appeal affirmed that, 
whatever label is used, partnership property is, as between the partners 
and unless otherwise agreed, subject to an implied “trust for sale”. The 
effect is that each partner has the right to receive, upon dissolution of 
the partnership, payment of his share of the firm’s surplus assets after 
the sale thereof and the discharge of its liabilities. Prior to dissolution, 
therefore, each partner has no claim to a particular asset or even a share 
in such asset: his claim is simply to his proportionate share of the net 
proceeds upon eventual sale: Chiam Heng Hsien at [112]. One 
consequence is that where the partnership asset in question is land it is 
treated, as between the partners, as personal property rather than real 
property. This is known as the equitable doctrine of conversion and is 
reflected in s 22 of the Partnership Act. The court explained that the 
reference in the proviso to s 20(1) of that Act to partnership land being 
held “on trust … for the persons beneficially interested in the land” (on 
which the first and second defendants had relied) had to be understood 
in this light: such trust is for the benefit of the partners as a whole and 
does not give in-specie rights in the land to any individual partner. 
Therefore, absent contrary agreement, such a partner does not have a 
specific interest in any particular partnership asset which is capable of 
devolving to his executors. Nor was the express trust on which Toh Say 
held the legal title for the “firm and the partners for the time being 
thereof ” inconsistent with the normal position described above. 
3.34 How the foregoing principles are to be applied in the case of a 
dissolution caused by the death (or retirement) of a partner depends on 
a further question: whether the firm’s business is to be terminated and 
wound up (known as a “general” dissolution) or continued by the 
remaining partners without a full winding-up (a “technical” 
dissolution). A partner or his personal representatives have a prima facie 
right to have the business wound up upon dissolution (s 39 of the 
Partnership Act), but this may be expressly or impliedly negated by the 
partnership agreement: Chiam Heng Hsien at [134]. The MHP 
partnership deed provided that a partner’s death “shall not dissolve the 
partnership as to the other partners”, thus indicating that the dissolution 
upon Toh Say’s death was a technical one only: Chiam Heng Hsien 
at [61]. Further, the court interpreted the winding-up clause (cl 21) of 
the partnership deed as giving his executors the right to have the value 
of his partnership share ascertained and paid out: Chiam Heng Hsien 
at [148]. 
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3.35 It may be observed that in some cases this may beg the question 
as to what valuation principles should apply in such a notional rather 
than a real winding up, where they are not spelt out in the deed. In fact, 
in Chiam Heng Hsien itself it may respectfully be queried whether cl 21, 
which in terms contemplated an actual winding up, strictly applied to a 
technical dissolution. However, the valuation question did not need to 
be answered in the present case because s 43 of the Partnership Act 
meant that the executors’ claim was deemed to be a debt rather than a 
claim under a trust. As such, it was subject to the six-year limitation 
period, which had long expired. (The Court of Appeal went on to opine, 
obiter, that s 43 would apply even in the case of a general dissolution, 
disagreeing with the view of Lindley & Banks on Partnership (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 19th Ed, 2010) at paras 23-34 and 26-03.) The court further 
rejected an argument that, exceptionally, time does not begin to run 
against a deceased partner’s estate where the firm’s business continues to 
be carried on after his death and no account has been rendered. Such 
exception was confined to claims for an account between the ongoing 
partners: Chiam Heng Hsien at [151]. 
3.36 Finally, the court noted an additional ground for applying the 
Limitation Act against the first and second defendants. As Toh Say’s 
executors, they had brought proceedings in 1993 against MHP and the 
plaintiff in the present proceedings, seeking an account of the value of 
Toh Say’s share. An interlocutory order had been made against the 
plaintiff which he did not comply with: as a result, his defence had been 
struck out and judgment entered against him in 1996. However, no steps 
had been taken to enforce that judgment which was subject to a 12-year 
limitation period. The Court of Appeal, accordingly, held that the 
executors’ original cause of action had merged in the 1996 judgment and 
was also time barred for that reason. As a result, Toh Say’s partnership 
share had been extinguished and the first and second defendants had no 
claim to share in the $12m. 
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